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THE ROLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN REGULATING
"MAD Cow DISEASE" AS EXPLAINED IN CREEKSTONE FARMS
PREMIUMBEEF,LLC v. DEPARTMENT OFA GRICULTURE
COURTNEY E.

Ross*

I. INTRODUCTION

The possibility of mad cow disease is enough to scare even the
savviest of hamburger connoisseurs. The disease may go undetected by the
average consumer, but the consequences can be deadly. As a result, the
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has taken steps to protect
American consumers against such risks. Under the authority of the VirusSerum-Toxin Act (VSTA), the USDA has promulgated several regulations
relating to the eradication of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE),'
or mad cow disease.2 Central to Creekstone Farms Premium Beef, LLC v.
Department of Agriculture3 is Creekstone's desire to test its cattle for BSE
before shipping it to customers. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit held that the USDA's ban on the type of
test used by Creekstone is valid.4 This Comment first discusses the legal
implications of VSTA and BSE. A discussion of the Court's analysis of
the agency's interpretation of VSTA and its relationship to the petitioner
Creekstone follows. Lastly, this Comment explores the implications of
Creekstone's holding on the cattle industry in the United States and abroad.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A.

The Virus-Serum-Toxin Act

Creekstone addresses the Virus-Serum-Toxin Act (hereinafter
"VSTA" or the "Act"), which Congress enacted in 1913. 5 Congress
initially passed VSTA to protect farmers from the sale of ineffective antihog cholera serum. 6 As set forth in the statute, VSTA bans the preparation,
* Staff Member, KENTUCKY JOURNAL OF EQUINE, AGRICULTURE, & NATURAL RESOURCES
LAw, 2008-2009. B.A. 2008, Centre College; J.D. expected May 2010, University of Kentucky College
of Law.
1 Creekstone Farms Premium Beef, LLC v. Dep't of Agric., 539 F.3d 492, 493 (D.C. Cir.
2008).
21Id.

31id.
4Id. at 503.
5
Id. at 493.

6id.
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sale, barter, exchange and shipment of "any worthless, contaminated,
dangerous or harmful virus, serum, toxin, or analogousproduct intended
for use in the treatment of domestic animals. 7 Additionally, VSTA also
states that "any virus, serum, toxin or analogous product manufactured
within the United States and intended for use in the treatment of domestic
animals" must be "prepared, under and in compliance with regulations
prescribed by the Secretary of Agriculture, at an establishment holding [a]
license issued by the Secretary of Agriculture." 8 The Act further requires a
permit from the Secretary for "any virus, serum, toxin, or analogous
product for use in the treatment of domestic animals" that is imported.9
The Act gives the Secretary rulemaking authority in Section 154.10
Section 154 states that the Secretary may "make and promulgate from time
to time such rules and regulations as may be necessary to prevent the
preparation, sale, barter, exchange, or shipment . . . of any worthless,
contaminated, dangerous, or harmful virus, serum, toxin, or analogous
product for use in the treatment of domestic animals, or otherwise to carry
out [VSTA].""
The USDA utilized this authority and promulgated several
12
regulations.

Two of these regulations are at issue in Creekstone. The first
regulation states that where the Administrator of USDA's Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service (APHIS) determines that the "protection of
domestic animals or the public health, interest, or safety, or both,
necessitates restrictions on the use of a [biological] product", then that
product is subject to restrictions stated on the license.' 3 The second
regulation prohibits import into the United States of any biological product
without a permit issued by the APHIS Administrator.' 4 The regulations
define "biological products" as including "all viruses, serums, toxins ...or
analogous products . . .which are intended for use in the treatment of
animals and which act primarily through the direct stimulation,
supplementation, enhancement, or modulation of the immune system or
immune response."' 5 Additionally, the regulations define "treatment" 16as
"the prevention, diagnosis,management, or cure of diseases of animals."'

7 21

U.S.C. § 151 (2000) (emphasis added).
8Id. (emphasis added).
9 21 U.S.C. § 152 (2000).
'0 See 21 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).

Id. (emphasis added).
12Creekstone, 539 F.3d at 494.

See 9 C.F.R. § 102.5(d) (2001).

'3

14See 9 C.F.R. § 104.1(a) (2001).
15 9 C.F.R. § 101.2 (2001) (emphasis added).
16 9

C.F.R. § 101.2(3) (2001) (emphasis added).
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History of BSE

In the years preceding the present case, BSE emerged as a serious
health concern. 17 Also known as "mad cow disease," it is defined by the
court as an "invariably fatal neurological disease that causes degeneration
of the cow's central nervous system."' 8 According to scientists, it results
when normally healthy proteins found in the nervous system of animals
such as cattle become "abnormal."' 9 These abnormal proteins are called
prions. Prions cause nerve cells in the cattle to "rupture, resulting in a
loss of coordination and ultimately the death of the animal.",2 ' Typically, the
disease passes from one animal to another through cow feed that includes
the remains of BSE infected cattle, ruminant.22
BSE can infect humans who consume contaminated beef or beef
products.23
When humans contract the disease, it is known as variant
Cruetzfeldt-Jakob Disease, or vCJD.24 Scientists believe that BSE first
originated in England where it was first diagnosed in 1986.25 BSE has
since been reported in at least twenty-five countries, including the United
States.26
The USDA first attempted to control the spread of BSE to the
United States in 1989 by banning the "importation of ruminant products
from countries with known BSE-infected cattle. 27 In 1997, the ban
expanded to include all ruminant feed for cattle.28 Despite efforts by the
USDA to prevent BSE from entering the country, three infected cows have
been identified in the United States. 29 The first case occurred in 2003 in
Washington State and involved an infected cow originating from Canada.3 °
A second case was identified in Texas in June of 2005, and the third cow
was located in Alabama in March of 2006. 3' In response to the existence of
BSE in the U.S., several large cattle importers such as Japan, South Korea,
and Mexico banned importation of all American beef.32 While some

Creekstone, 539 F.3d at 495.
Id. at 494.
'9 Id. at 494-495.
20
Id. at 494.
"

IS

21 Id. at 495.
22 Creekstone, 539

F.3d at 495.

23id.
24

id.

25 id.
26 id.
27 Id.

21 Creekstone,
29

id.

30 id.
31 Id.
32
Id. at 496.

539 F.3d at 495.
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countries have lifted such restrictions, Japan and South Korea continue to
restrict importation of American cattle.33
As a result of these infections, testing for BSE became necessary in
the United States. In June 2004, APHIS initiated a 26-month program
under which it tested 750,000 cattle for BSE.34 Then, due to the low rate of
infection, the USDA decided to lower the number of cattle to be tested.35 In
2006, the USDA intended to test only 40,000 cattle, or roughly 1% of the
cattle slaughtered per year.36
C.

Testingfor BSE
Several ways exist to test cattle for BSE.37 The most common way

is referred to as the "immunoassay," or the "rapid" BSE test.38 This is the

type of test the plaintiff intended to use. 39 However, there are several
problems with the rapid BSE test.40 First, the prions that identify BSE are

only detected "if they exist in a relatively high concentration."4' 1 This limits
the effectiveness of the test because the prions are only detectable two to
three months before the cow begins to show physical signs of the disease.4 2
Second, it is possible that the rapid BSE test will not even catch the disease
before the cattle go to slaughter because of the long incubation period of the
disease.4 3 The incubation period is between two and eight years, which
means that because the average cow is two years old at slaughter, it will not
likely show a positive rapid BSE test.44 Consequently, the USDA has
45
concluded that use of this test is inefficient because of these limitations.
Moreover, the USDA has described the testing of clinically normal young
cattle impractical, of no food safety value, and likely to produce false
negative results. 46 However, the USDA has described the rapid BSE test as
meaningful and reliable when used for surveillance purposes on animals
exhibiting some type of clinical abnormality that could be consistent with
BSE.47

33Id.
3 Creekstone, 539 F.3d at 495.
35Id.
36 id.
37Id.
38id.

'9Creekstone, 539 F.3d at 496.
40Id. at 495.
41 Id.
42
Id. at 496.
43Id.
4 id.
41Creekstone, 539 F.3d at 496.
4 Id.
47id.
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III. CASE HISTORY

The petitioner in Creekstone v. Department of Agriculture was
Creekstone Farms Premium Beef, LLC. Creekstone raises Black Angus
cattle and slaughters almost 300,000 animals per year.48 In response to the
health emergency regarding BSE, Creekstone decided to test its cattle for
the disease with the above-mentioned rapid BSE test kits.4 9 However, when
Creekstone attempted to purchase the test kits from Bio-Rad Laboratories,
Inc., Bio-Rad informed Creekstone that USDA authorization was required
before the tests could be sold. ° In compliance with this requirement,
Creekstone requested authorization on February 19, 2004, as well as in
several later communications with the USDA. 1 Creekstone's requests
were denied, and on March 17, 2004, the USDA issued a notice stating the
rapid BSE test kits were only available to "USDA-approved laboratories. 5 2
It also stated the "distribution and use" of all BSE tests was under the
control of the USDA. 3
In a letter dated June 1, 2004, the USDA formally prohibited
Creekstone from purchasing the BSE test kits. 4
The letter stated
"[A]llowing a company to use a BSE test in a private marketing program is
inconsistent with USDA's mandate to ensure effective, scientifically sound
testing for significant animal diseases and maintain domestic and
international confidence in U.S. cattle and beef products."55
Consequently, Creekstone filed suit based on three claims. 6 First,
Creekstone argued that the USDA's regulation of biological products was
ultra vires57 because VSTA "provides no authorization at all for restrictions
in the use of products. 5 8 Along the same lines, Creekstone claimed that the
"definition of 'treatment' contained in regulation Section 101.2 goes
'beyond the scope of the rulemaking authority granted to USDA in the
VSTA."'' 9 Second, Creekstone claimed that regulation concerning the
rapid BSE tests are not used to "treat domestic animals" as required by
VSTA because it does not "act primarily through the direct stimulation,
supplementation, enhancement or modulation of the immune system or
48

Id. at 493.
Id. at 496.
50
Id.
s'Creekstone, 539 F.3d at 496.
52 Id. (quoting USDA, Center For Veterinary Biologics Notice No. 04-08 (March 17, 2004)).
53 Creekstone, 539 F.3d at 496.
s4Id. at 496-497.
55
Id. (quoting Letter from Bill Hawkes, USDA, to John D. Steward, Creekstone Farms (June
49

1,2004)).

, Creekstone, 539 F.3d at 497.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1559 (8th ed. 2004) (Ultra vires is defined as "Unauthorized:
beyond the scope of power allowed or granted by a corporate charter or by law.").
5" Creekstone,539 F.3d at 497 (emphasis in original).
59Id.
57
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immune response. '6' ° Third, Creekstone argued that the USDA's decision
to deny it the right to use rapid BSE tests is "arbitrary and capricious" and a
"violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)." 6 1
Both parties moved for summary judgment on Counts I and II, but
neither moved for summary judgment on Count 111.62 On March 29, 2007,
the lower court granted the USDA's motion for Count I and "upheld
USDA's broad interpretation of 'treatment' in Sections 151-5 of the Act. ' 63
The court also granted Creekstone's motion in regard to Count II on the
ground that the BSE tests are not used in the treatment of domestic animals
because there is no cure for the disease.6
Consequently, it held that
"because testing can be done only post-mortem, rapid BSE test kits are not
used for 'treatment' as that term is defined in 9 C.F.R. § 101.2(3). " 65

III. ANALYSIS
A.

Holding

The court held that the USDA acted within its authority delegated
by VSTA by regulating biological products in the "use" of the treatment of
domestic animals.66 Consequently, a rapid BSE test kit, which is properly
classified as a "biological product," may be restricted under VSTA.67 The
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals employed de novo review in
its consideration of the lower court's grant of summary judgment.68
B.

Count One: USDA 's "Use" Regulations

In its review of Count I, the Court addressed whether the BSE rapid
test kits fall within the authority of the USDA's "use" regulations, which
are found in 9 C.F.R. §§ 102.5(d) and 104.1.69 The court phrased the issue
as "whether USDA can regulate the use of biological products under
VSTA. ' 70 The USDA's authority to regulate arises in two forms in Section
154.7 ' First, the language of Section 154 gives the USDA rulemaking
authority to promulgate "such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
6 Id.
61Id.
62id.
63
6
65

Id.
Creekstone, 539 F.3d at 497.

Id.
Id. at 503.
67 Id.
6

68 Id. at 497.
69
70

Id. at 498 n.8.
Creekstone, 539 F.3d at 498.

71

Id.
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prevent the preparation, sale, barter, exchange, or shipment . . . of any
worthless, contaminated, dangerous, or harmful virus, serum, toxin or
analogous product for use in the treatment in domestic animals. 7 2 Because
this language is limited by the second clause requiring the products to be
"worthless, contaminated, dangerous, or harmful," the court concluded that
3
Section 154 did not authorize the USDA to regulate BSE rapid test kits.7
The court then proceeded to the second grant of authority found in
Section 154, which authorizes the USDA to promulgate "such rules and
74
regulations as may be necessary... otherwise to carry out this chapter.,
The U.S. argued that the Chevron standard of review" should apply
because of the broad language employed by the section to permit the
76
regulation of biological products, but the court applied the Skidmore
analysis instead. 17 The court acknowledged that it usually analyzes agency
interpretation cases under the more deferential Chevron doctrine. 78
However, it concluded "Chevron does not apply to the 'otherwise to carry
out' language because that language was not added to the statute until 1985
...almost ten years after USDA promulgated the predecessor of Section
102.5(d)., 79 In addition, the court stated the "USDA may not reasonably
rely on statutory language that did not exist when it first adopted its
regulation. 8 0
In applying the Skidmore analysis, Judge Henderson wrote that
"[t]he weight [accorded to an administrative judgment] in a particular case
will depend on the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control."8'
The court concluded that Section 102.5(d) did satisfy this
Skidmore analysis8 2 because the court concluded Section 102.5(d) "reflects
considered agency deliberation," "has been consistently applied since
1976," and "is reasonably related to the purposes of VSTA, namely, to
ensure the safety and efficacy of any product that is intended to be used in
treating domestic animals. 8 3
7221 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
73Creekstone, 539 F.3d at 498.
74id.

75 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
76 See

Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).

7 Creekstone,539 F.3d at 498.
78id.
79id.
80 id.
81 Id. at

499, quoting U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (quoting Skidmore, 323

U.S. at 140 (second alteration in Mead)).
82 Creekstone,539 F.3d at 499.
83 Id.
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The court also deferred to the agency's interpretation of Section
104.1 because it found the USDA's interpretation "not inconsistent with the
regulation." 84 Section 104.1 authorizes the Administrator to prevent
biological products from entering the U.S. without a permit.8 5 The court
held that despite any express provision authorizing the Administrator to
deny "an import permit based on the product's intended use (in this case,
sales to Creekstone), USDA so interprets the regulation" 86 and the
interpretation was held to be valid.87
Creekstone made several arguments in support of the USDA acting
beyond its authority. First, it employed a doctrine of negative implication,
expressio unuis est exclusion alterius,to suggest that "the omission of 'use'
from VSTA's provisions precluded USDA from promulgating a 'use'
regulation. '' 88 However, the court stated that this doctrine had "minimal, if
any, application" 89 because of the broad language in the statute and the
administrative nature of the proceedings. Second, Creekstone submitted
that the "otherwise carry out" phrase in Section 154 could not support the
"use" regulations because the "otherwise carry out" language was not added
until almost a decade after the passage of the original statute. 90 However,
the court quoted the district court when it stated that this theory "cuts both
ways." 9' It concluded that "Congress's 1985 decision to leave section
102.5(d) undisturbed 92is 'persuasive evidence' that is it consistent with
congressional intent.,
Creekstone made a third argument that the legislative history
behind VSTA suggested that Congress only contemplated the regulation of
"manufacturers and importers of biological products, not users like
[itself]. ' Despite its introduction of testimony during the 1913 House
Committee on Agriculture that suggested the regulation was intended for
other purposes, the court concluded that the legislative history regarding to
VSTA is "extremely sparse" 94 and insufficient to support either
interpretation.95
Lastly, Creekstone cited the House Conference Report for the
Agriculture Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002 (ABPA) to support its
contention that VSTA lacks the authority to promulgate "use" regulations.96
84
8'

Creekstone, 539 F.3d at 499.
9 C.F.R. §104.1 (2001).

86 Creekstone,
87

539 F.3d at 499.

Id.

88Id.
89
Id.

at 500.

9 Id.
91 Id.
92 Creekstone, 539 F.3d at 500.
93

Id. at 501.

94 Id. (quoting Animal Health Inst. v. USDA, 487 F.Supp. 376, 378 (D.Co.1980)).

9' Creekstone,539 F.3d at 501.

96id.
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However, the court disagreed by stating that "the ABPA governs only those
substances that 'pose a severe threat to plant or animal health,"' while
VSTA governs all biological products. 97 The court further dismissed
Creekstone's interpretation with its conclusion that Congress, in drafting
ABPA, specifically exempt products already covered by VSTA from the
authority of ABPA.98
The court found 9 C.F.R. § 102.5(d) to be a valid grant of authority
to the USDA to impose restrictions on the use of a biological product. 99
Thus, the court concluded that the USDA may regulate the use of BSE
tests. 10
C.

Count Two: Meaning of "Treatment"

Creekstone argued that the regulation of the rapid BSE test was not
within VSTA's authority because the domestic animals were not being
"treated" as required by Section 101.2.0' While the district court agreed
with this argument, the appellate court did not.'0 2 Contrary to the argument
set forth by Creekstone and accepted by the lower court, Judge Henderson
interpreted the term "treatment" broadly.10 3 The court focused on Section
101.2's definition of "treatment," which explains that it is "the prevention,
diagnosis, management or cure of diseases of animals."'04 Because the
rapid BSE test kit need only meet one of these requirements, the court held
that the test's use in diagnosing BSE was sufficient.' °5 It also stated that
the test "plays a valuable role in preventing and managing the spread of
BSE" by "allow[ing] USDA to identify and destroy the remains of an
infected cow, trace the spread of the disease and evaluate the success of its
disease management measures."' 6 The court was not persuaded by the
argument that the test does not treat a cow once it has already been
slaughtered because of these diagnostic purposes.' ° Thus, the court was
satisfied that the USDA's interpretation was a reasonable
reading of
"diagnosis" as it is used in the definition of "treatment."' 08

97id.
98Id.

99Id. at 502.
10°Id.
'0' Creekstone,539 F.3d at 502.

12Id.
103Id.

o4'Id. (quoting 9 C.F.R. § 101.2 (2001) (emphasis added)).
'05Creekstone,539 F.3d at 502.
107Id.

108Id.
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Additionally, Creekstone attempted to use past statements by the
agency to invalidate this characterization of the test kits.'0 9 In a rulemaking
decision concerning the importation of Japanese beef in 2005, the USDA
stated that "BSE testing of cattle at slaughter is not 'meaningful in the
context of ... animal health' and that the surveillance testing for BSE 'is
not a [disease] mitigation measure."'' l0 The USDA further explained in
this statement that the testing is not meaningful because it does "not
produce meaningful results.""' However, the court found that USDA's
comment regarding meaningless results referred "only to blanket BSE
testing and not to the efficacy of BSE testing when used on high-risk cattle
only." ' 2 The court attempted to characterize the USDA's comment as one
relating to BSE testing as a whole, as opposed to the particularized test in
the present case." 3 In conclusion, the court found the USDA's definition
4
of "treatment" in 9 C.F.R. § 101.2(3) to be reasonable."
V. IMPLICATIONS

The holding of Creekstone Farms Premiums Beef, LLC v.
Department of Agriculture essentially prevents Creekstone from testing its
cattle in the manner that it sees fit. The court of appeals granted the USDA
wide discretion in its interpretation of the VSTA. In fact, this was the main
concern of Chief Judge Sentelle in his dissent." 5 He writes "...the
Department exceeds the bounds of reasonableness in the interpretation
assumed in its regulation."' 16 Chief Judge Sentelle disagreed that the rapid
BSE test kit falls within the phrase "analogous product" or that it is a form
of "treatment" as mandated by the Act." 7 The dissent also refused to accept
the conclusion that Section 154's "otherwise carry out" language
encompasses the "use" of biological products."'
While several public policy arguments support the discretion
awarded to agencies by courts, Creekstone v. Department of Agriculture
seems to be an example of a court going too far. As emphasized by the
dissent, an agency must act within the authority given to it from Congress

1'9 Id.
"o Id.; see Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan, 70 Fed. Reg. 73,905,
73,914 (Dec. 14, 2005) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 94).
.. Creekstone, 539 F.3d at 502; see Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan,
70 Fed. Reg. 73,905, 73,914 (Dec. 14,2005) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 94).
"2 Creekstone, 539 F.3d at 503.
1 13
1d

114Id.

' Id. at 504.
116id.

117Id.
IS

Creekstone, 539 F.3d at 504.
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to prevent the possibility of a "roving commission." ' 1 9 The outcome
appears to be inconsistent with the goal of the USDA. Instead of actively
encouraging beef producers to safeguard their products, the agency is
prohibiting Creekstone from voluntarily testing its cattle. Because the
effects of BSE result in the loss of human life, it seems reasonable that the
USDA would err on the side of caution and support companies like
Creekstone that willingly accept added costs for the benefit of the
consumer.
More importantly for Kentucky, the Commonwealth ranks twelfth
in all cattle and calf production in the U.S. 20 With regard to beef cows,
Kentucky ranks eighth in the country. 12' As a result, local slaughterhouses
may be subjected to the same fate as Creekstone. Under this precedent,
they will be similarly barred from proactive testing. It seems likely that the
decision in favor of the USDA will be appealed and it is possible that the
case will be overturned. Therefore, allowing private distributors to use
rapid BSE test kits may be a possibility in the future.
VI. CONCLUSION

After Creekstone, private distributors are prevented from
employing rapid BSE test kits without authorization from the USDA. The
court accepted the agency's broad interpretation of VSTA in its
promulgation of several regulations. In the end, the rapid BSE test kits
have been lumped into the category of "treatment of domestic animals"
because they have been characterized as "biological products."
Consequently, the USDA remains the sole authority on who may test for
BSE and in what manner, leaving Creekstone Farms without the option to
privately test its own meat.

"9Id. (quoting BP West Coast Products, LLC v. FERC, 374 F.3d 1263, 1293 (D.C.Cir.2004)
(quoting Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075, 1084 (D.C.Cir.2001))).
120 Ky. Dep't of Agric., Kentucky Agricultural Statistics and Annual Report, 2006-2007,
availableat http://www.kyagr.com/pr/agstats/index.htm.
121 Id.

